ITOPF puts this spill at 37000T.
Environmental Report for TAPS Right or Way Renewal says 257,143B.
Exxon and NTSB says 258,000 barrels.
Crew was 20, far too few to properly man a VLCC.
The Mate's screw up would be much more difficult,
now that we have GPS and ECDIS.
Obviously, the Master should have been on the bridge,
both by rule and common sense.
He left a tired 3rd mate with the tricky task
of manuevering between the ice and Bligh Reef at night.
Whether or not Hazelwood was drunk,
he is clearly at fault,
as is Exxon for manning a VLCC with a ridiculously small crew.
After the grounding the crew did nothing,
other than some strange engine maneuvers by the Captain
in an apparent attempt to get the ship off the reef
(which probably would have resulted in the ship sinking).
In fact, what they should have done is tied to
to seal off the breached cargo tanks,
develop a vacuum in the top of those tanks,
which would have kept most of the oil on-board.
CTX has done a
which indicates that successfully sealing the tanks
would have kept two-thirds of the oil on-board.
All parties agree that almost all the oil was spilled
in the first half tidal cycle.
Exxon calculated that 22,000 m3 was spilled in 3.75 hours.
The Chief Mate testified
that they lost about 100,000 barrels in less than half an hour.
This is unlikely since the tide was still coming in.
He is probably confusing flow out of cargo tanks
with net loss.
Most of the initial outflow from the cargo tanks
would have been into the empty Forepeak, 2S and 4S
At the end of the day, these three tanks captured
about 15,000 m3 (97,000 barrels);
but initially there would have been considerably
more oil in these tanks,
a portion of which was lost as the tide went out.
Ship was under VTC but VTC did nothing.
Ship was on "load program up" after dropping off pilot at 11:24.
It appears that the speed on impact was about 12 or 13 knots.
One argument for switching lanes rather than pushing
slowly thru the ice was poor slow speed manuerverability.
But they were so far off course, it is hard to argue
that twin screw would have made a difference here.
What is clear is that the damage extended over 240 m
back into the hull, demostrating the futility
of attempting to build a tanker with a bottom
strong enough to make a difference in a major grounding.
In Cousin's appeal, both sides seems to have accepted
that the speed on grounding was about 11 knots.
On top of the costs listed above,
in 1994 an Alaskan jury awarded an additional 5.3 billion dollars in punitive damages.
The district court instructed the jury
that they could award vicarious punitive damages
even if they found that all the recklessness was on the part of the vessel's master.
Exxon appealed but this appeal was rejected in 2000 by an Alaskan appeals court.
In 2001, the 9th Circuit court reduced the punitive damage to 4.5B,
and then again to 2.5B in 2006, citing intervening Supreme Court decisions.
Exxon appealed to the Supreme Court
which agreed to review some of the points of argument.
At this point, Exxon claims that it has already paid 3.4 billion
in clean up costs, natural resource claims, fines and penalties.
2.5B in punitive damages would bring the total to just under 6 billion dollars.
On 2008-06-26 the Supreme Court ruled that punitive damages
could be awarded but were limited by the amount of compensatory danages.
This reduced the punitive damages to 507.5 million dollars.
So in the end it looks like the total cost to Exxon
was about 4 billion dollars, roughly $100 per liter.