Precis File
SHIP NAME:EvoikosKEY:NUM. ENTRIES:8
sourceLMIU
typeD
volumeY
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In collision with tanker Orapin Global in Singapore Strait, just off Singapore limits, 15 Oct 1997 Huge gash in port side, 3 tanks holed, major oil spill Spillage stopped by 16 Oct Oil transhipped 06 Nov Sailed 12 Apr 1998. Arrived Chittagong 27 Apr 1998 for break-up.


sourceOSIR-1997-10-23
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Denholm (the OG managers) and MPA say the ships collided in the buffer zone between the eastbound and westbound lanes. MPA claims VTS told Orapin Global it was in the wrong lane 13 minutes before the collision.


sourceUNK
typeD
volume25,000T
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The Enoikos and the Oraphin Global collided at 2100 15 Oct near the Singapore port limits about 3 miles south of Pulau Sebarok. The Enoikos was sailing from Fujairah, UAE, to Singapore with 120,000 tons of marine fuel oil. Two cargo tanks ruptured spilling up to 25,000t of marine fuel oil and the ship anchored 2 miles SE of Pulau Sebarok. Damage includes a gash on the port side 50 m long and 10 m wide, from the deck to below the waterline. The Oraphin Global was sailing in ballast east to west. Visibility at the time of collision was 5 miles and both vessels had been warned of a collision course by the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information Service.


sourceIOPCF
typeD
volume29,000T
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sourceOSIR-1998-07-01
typeA
volume29,000T
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The Polish captain of the VLCC involved in Singapore's worst oil spill pleaded guilty on 29 June to charges of negligent navigation and speeding. Jan Sokolowski commanded the Thai flagged Orapin Global when it rammed the laden Cypriot tanker Evoikos amidships on 15 October 1997. Torn open the Evoikos spilled 8.5 million gallons (29,000 tonnes) of heavy fuel oil.

Sokolowski admitted that his ship continued to "navigate against the flow of traffic ... after completing an overtaking maneuver" and twice failed to signal warning blasts on the ship's whistle. Sokolowski also pleaded guilt to sailing at 14 knots, when IMO routing rules limit VLCC's to 12 knots in the narrow busy Singapore Straits.

In presenting the city-state's case, prosecutor Wong Keen Onn said the westbound Orapin Global moved into the eastbound traffic lane to overtake another vessel at 8:37 PM LT on 15 October. It remained in the wrong lane at least seven minutes longer than necessary, despite timely instructions by an operator of Singapore's Vessel Traffic Information System, Wong said.

When the Orapin Global began turning back into the westbound lane, VTIS advised the ship that Evoikos was turning into Singapore harbor to pick up a pilot and discharge oil. At that point, Sokolowski should have warned the Evoikos with five blasts of the horn, but did not, Wong said. By 8:52 pm, the ships were less than 2 km apart and closing, he said.


sourceBarret and Grasso
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In July 1998, the master of the VLCC Orapin Global pleaded guilty to charges of negligence and speeding in connection with an oil spill resulting from a collision. The master was fined and sentenced to two months in jail, and the master of the other vessel was charged with breach of duty and failing to take action to avoid the collision. He also admitted to failing to keep a proper lookout, and was fined and sentenced to three months in jail.


sourceETC
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volume200000B
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sourceCTX
typeD
volume28000T
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This collision is an interesting example of lack of communication, both between the vessels and the VTS (Vessel Traffic Control System). The Orapin Global was westbound in ballast. The Evoikos was eastbound loaded but her destination was Singapore, which meant she had to cross the westbound lane to pick up the Singapore mooring pilot. Both ships were under the control of the Singapore VTS. At this point, the westbound (north) lane is 600 m wide, then there is a 200 m wide buffer zone, and the eastbound deep water lane is 700 m wide. Since these ships are more than 200 m long, it is very tight quarters.

At 2041, the VTS warned the Orapin Global that she was in the buffer zone. The OG acknowledged saying she was overtaking a slower ship and, as soon as she passed, she would come back to starboard to get fully in her lane. Meanwhile the Evoikos is looking for a break in the traffic to turn to port and cross the westbound lane to get to the pilot boarding station. It was night with visibility of 5 miles. With the OG's jog to port, it looks to the Evoikos' ARPA (automatic radar plotting system) that she can pass in front of the OG. (The ARPA shows the closest point of approach of other ships, provided both ships maintain present course and speed). At 2046, the VTS warned the Orapin Global of risk of collision with the Enoikos, but does not tell the OG the Evoikos's destination. At 2048, the VTS warns the Evoikos of risk of collision with the the OG. Both ships go hard to starboard to try to get back to a port to port passing. But at this point this is the wrong thing to do. At 2054, the ships collide. At no point did the two ships talk to each other. Nor did the VTS tell either ship what the other was trying to do. It reminds you a little of the Oregon Standard/Arizona Standard collision 25 years earlier.

It is in interesting that neither owner really contested the case; rather they left their Captains out to dry. Tanker owners are not famous for their loyalty to their crews, and their lawyers undoubtedly pointed out that attempting to put blame on Singapore in a Singapore court wasn't going to work. The public is left with the impression the spill was caused by two rogue cowboys. In hindsight, it is easy to say that the OG should not have passed slower traffic at this point, and that the Evoikos should not have tried to squeeze thru the apparent gap, but the real problem is the system.

CTX could find nothing like the dispassionate UK/Australian investigation reports.

Spill volume estimates range from 25,000 to 29,000 Tons which seems a lot from three tanks. The Enoikos was a 1977 built, 140,000 tonner. THe OG is a VLCC. The damage is described as 50 m long, 10 m high, from deck to waterline. Looks like the angle of contact was fairly low. They almost made it back to a port to port passing. We need tank plan and loading plan. OG was scrapped.

OSIR 1998-10-10 says that after this collision, Singapore changed the VTS rules. All ships over 300 GRT are required to report in. Further VTS will issue danger warnings to all ships approaching any of the three precautionary zones, that is the areas where ships cross the traffic lanes to enter Singapore. Somebody felt that the VTS could have done a better job.